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Abstract 
 
Debate in philosophy of cognition between computatationalists and dynamists often are found to be 
taking past one another. This is largely due to inconsistency within the dynamic camp regarding whether 
or not there are representations; and for those that do affirm them, clarifying how a representation is to be 
conceived and used under a dynamical system paradigm. Having been equipped with an understanding of 
a dynamic conception of representation may prove resourceful for giving a dynamic account for 
cognitive tasks in a ‘representation-hungry’ problem domain, largely thought only to be explained 
through a computational cognitive model.  
 
 
 
 
 
The Watt Governor: Computational and Dynamic versions 
 
The big engineering problem during the industrial revolution was how to deliver a 
smooth, continuous, source of power. More specifically there was a desire to transfer 
the turning action of the steam piston into a revolving motion of the flywheel. Because 
of the variations, depending on the particular workloads and etc., the speed of the 
flywheel would often be in flux. In order for the speed of flywheel to be regulated, a 
throttle valve was employed to control the amount of steam entering the pistons. 
Originally, some unfortunate human was tasked with constantly making the appropriate 
adjustments to the throttle valve. 
 
The Computational Governor 
 
As an alternative from employing a human to govern the throttle valve, van Gelder 
suggests one could approach the problem by breaking the overall task into subtasks, 
one could then see how to devise subcomponents that each handle a particular part of 
the overall task. Van Gelder offers the various subtasks. 1) Measure the speed of the 
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flywheel. 2) Determine whether there is a difference between the actual speed and 
desired speed. 3) If there is no difference then return to task 1, if there is a difference, 
the governor must make the appropriate changes to the throttle valve. To this end, the 
governor will have to measure the current steam pressure and calculate the needed 
alteration. Next, determine the needed throttle valve adjustment, then 4) make the 
appropriate changes and return to step 1 (Van Gelder, What Might Cog. 347-348). Each 
of the tasks above, van Gelder suggests could be implemented by a physical devise. So 
one can think of the governor as comprised of multiple assembles that measure speed 
and steam, calculate discrepancies, and make adjustments. All of which is controlled by 
a central command to see to the sequencing of operations. Van Gelder calls this the 
computational governor. 
 
The Watt Governor 
 
The suggestion above would have been successful for an automated steam engine; 
however this was not the method James Watts devised for solving the problem. Van 
Gelder’s suggestion above required more advanced calculating devices that would have 
been unavailable during that time. Watt’s solution comprised of attaching a spindle into 
the flywheel, thus making its rotational speed mechanically related to that of the 
flywheel. He also attached, via hinges, two arms to the spindle, each bearing a metal 
ball on the end. So as the spindle rotated at a higher rate the two arms would move 
outward, via centrifugal force, and due to the hinges move upward (See figure A)1. This 
process was connected to the throttle valve. Thus as the wheel speed increased, the 
arms connected to the spindle would rise, closing the throttle valve; whereas when the 
wheel decreased in speed the arms would lower, causing the throttle valve to open to 
allow more steam to the pistons. In this manner, the steam engine could maintain a 
consistent speed with an elegant swiftness (Van Gelder, What Might Cog. 248-249). 
 
Van Gelder claims the 
differences between the two 
governors has fruitful 
implications for cognitive 
science. The computational 
governor it is constructed in 
such a way that it achieves its 
goal by implementing an 
algorithm that involves use of 
representations across the 
subcomponents. For example, 
the first task is to measure the 
                                                          
1 This image was taken from: http://maybach300c.blogspot.com/2012/07/1-introduction-to-
control-systems.html  
Figure A 
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current speed of the flywheel to obtain a representation of the engine speed. This 
representation, in concert with other representations will produce, via computation, an 
output, namely an adjustment to the throttle valve—if needed. Van Gelder points out 
that such a system is homuncular. In other words, each subcomponent interacts, via 
representations, with another forming an interdependent cluster. With representations 
playing a central role of the computational governor, the greatest contrast would be to 
consider the non-representational construction of the Watt governor (Van Gelder, What 
Might Cog. 351).  
 
Van Gelder maintains, on the Watt governor the arm angle on the spindle is intimately 
related to the engine speed, but not by way of representation. To support this claim he 
gives four reasons. First he proposes a criterion to tell whether or not a system contains 
representations by asking if there is any useful explanatory power in appealing to 
representations to explain the system. In other words, can one make more sense of how 
the system works by employing representational talk? If one cannot, then why think 
that there are representations (Van Gelder, What Might Cog 352).  
 
The second reason consists in stressing that even if the arm angle is causally correlated 
with the engine speed, mere correlation does not give rise to representation. If one were 
to think so, then representations would be rendered useless for any explanatory power, 
being that everything can be seen in correlation in one way or another with something 
else. His third reason, which shores up the second, is that the supposed correlation 
between the arm angle and engine speed only occurs when the system has reached a 
stable equilibrium point. However, the actual engine speed may drop suddenly, while 
the angle arms move at a relatively slower pace according to gravitational acceleration. 
Therefore, there is in fact no simple correlation between the angle arm and engine 
speed (Van Gelder, What Might Cog. 353).  
 
The fourth reason—and what van Gelder feels is the most substantial—why the Watt 
governor is not representational is that once the relationship is fully comprehended, 
between the arm angles and engine speed, the conceptual framework of representations 
does not apply. It is the wrong conceptual tool for the job. He contends that since the 
angle arms are directly related to the throttle valve, and the throttle valve determines the 
amount of steam in the piston the engine speed is always determined by, and 
determining the angle of the arms. Hence, there is a continuous co-determining 
relationship in contrast to the discrete states in the homuncular system of the 
computational governor. Van Gelder explains that this relation is captured by the 
mathematical language of dynamics—namely, differential equations. For example, 
according to van Gelder, this particular formula: 
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𝑑2𝜃
𝑑𝑡2
 = (ηω)2 cos𝜃 sin𝜃 − 𝑔
𝑙
 sin𝜃 − r 𝑑𝜃
𝑑𝑡
 
where 𝜃 is the angle of the arms, η is a gearing constant, ω is the speed of the engine, 𝑔 
is a constant for gravity, 𝑙 is the length of the arms, and 𝑟 is a constant of friction at the 
hinges, explains how change in the arm angle is changing, in relation to the current arm 
angle, in the manner it is changing already, and the engine speed (Van Gelder, What 
Might Cog. 353,356). 
 
In review, van Gelder sees a computational system as one with cyclical discrete states 
and interdependent subcomponents that communicate with one another via 
representations in a state setting manner i.e. many variables can remain the same 
throughout state transitions. For instance, consider the algorithm above, in step three if 
no change is needed the variables will remain in the same state returning to step one. 
Such a system is homuncular. On the other hand, dynamic systems are without discrete 
intermediate states; rather the system is coupled continuously where input is seen as a 
continuing influence on the direction of change and the output as an ongoing influence 
of something else. For example consider the dynamic interaction above regarding the 
angle arms and the engine speed of the Watt governor—two systems co-determine one 
another’s change (Van Gelder, What Might Cog. 357 & The Dynamical Hypothesis 
621-622). Therefore, since there are no discrete states, or communication via 
representations, nor a need to employ representational talk to explain the Watt 
governor, Van Gelder concludes that governor to be non-representational. 
 
Is the Watt Governor Representational After All? 
 
Philosopher William Bechtel contends that contrary to van Gelder both governors are 
representational, and addresses all four of van Gelder’s reasons above, maintaining that 
the angle arms stand in for, that is to say represent, the speed of the engine. Bechtel 
doubts a system can be said to be representational or not by simply considering if 
people describe how the system works by using representational terms. Rather, what is 
important is if the system identifies states which stand in for other states and are used 
by the system precisely since they stand in. He points out the van Gelder’s own account 
appeals to the angle of the arms standing in for the speed of the flywheel, noting that 
the arms fell when the speed of the flywheel decreased and rose when it increased. 
Thus, Bechtel points out in order for us to understand why this mechanism works one 
has to understand how the angle arms stand in for the speed of the flywheel. 
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Bechtel contends the Watt governor is composed of three separate components (see 
Figure B)2, all of which operate according to different engineering principles. The 
throttle valve, which determines the steam pressure, coupled with the resistance 
occurring from the work done by the engine, determines the speed in which the 
flywheel rotates. The physical principles acting here are, namely, steam pressure and 
mechanical resistance. Recall from above, that the spindle, with the two angle arms, 
was attached to the flywheel, where the spindle speed determines the angle of the arms 
via centrifugal force; and the angle arms are mechanically linked to the throttle valve. 
Once the three components are separated and correctly associated with their particular 
principles in which they work, one is in a position to appreciate how the angle arms 
relate to the other two components. Bechtel now asks one to consider why the spindle 
was needed in the first place. The answer is that while the flywheel has a speed there 
was not a way to open and shut the throttle valve. Thus the spindle was needed to 
encode information regarding the speed in such a way that could be capitalized by the 
throttle valve. Therefore, Bechtel contends that since the governor is so simple people 
just see the connection directly, but if one did not know how the governor worked the 
first thing that would draw attention would be how the angle arms register the speed of 
the flywheel (Bechtel, 301-303).  
 
As far as van Gelder’s second claim, Bechtel agrees that correlation between things is 
not enough to infer representation, and insists the on importance of use in determining 
representations. In regards to the third reason offered by van Gelder, and one we will 
return to later, Bechtel objects that just because the angle of the spindle arms can lag 
behind the speed of the flywheel does not by itself show the angle arms to not be 
representational. Furthermore, he claims advocates of representation allow that when an 
                                                          
2 This image was taken from an online version of the same article cited. It can be found online at: 
http://mechanism.ucsd.edu/research/REPRESENT.html  
Figure B 
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effect represents its cause there can be many interim steps in creating the representation 
(Bechtel, 303-304). 
 
In regards to van Gelder’s final claim for rejecting representation, Bechtel is unsure 
how the complex and subtle relationship of the Watt governor is so much so, that it 
cannot satisfy the stand-in function of representation. He maintains that “something can 
stand in for something else coupled to in a dynamic manner, and by being so coupled 
figure in determining a response that alters the very thing being represented” (Bechtel, 
304 emphasis in the original). 
 
The Dynamical Representation of the Watt Governor 
 
Bechtel’s objections are useful to draw out a dynamical conception of representation. 
First of all the supposed intermediate steps of the angle arms are not steps at all. Although 
there is change, it is in continuous fluctuation and thus no discrete states stand in for 
anything. These continuous perturbations in the angle arms constitute the subtle 
complexly that precludes the standing in function of computational representation.  
 
Where representation does occur, according to a dynamic system theorist (DST), is 
during an equilibrium point (Van Gelder, The Dynamical Hypothesis, 622). In the case 
of the Watt governor, when the angle arms are correlated with the engine speed a 
system state of equilibrium has been achieved across the system. In this case, the 
equilibrium point can be thought of as a dynamic system state. Suppose this  ideal 
system state were to continue on for such a time that the actual materials composing the 
Watt governor were altered—worn in such a way, or etc—so that the system, if stopped 
and restarted, would tend toward the previous system state. The force driving the 
system to such a state would function like an attractor basin.             
 
Some Problem Domains for Dynamical Representation  
 
A different type of critique leveled at the DST does not so much object to their claim 
that that some aspects of cognition may be non-representational, but rather that the 
problem domain of non-representation exhibited by the Watt governor is not applicable 
for many cognitive tasks. Philosophers Andy Clark and Josefa Toribio generally agree 
with all of van Gelder’s four reasons for thinking the Watt governor is non-
representational, but strongly object to the general conclusion that representational 
analyses are not sufficient to account for the full understanding of the pairing of 
dynamical systems such as agents and environment (Clark & Toribio, 418). The 
insurmountable problem according to Clark and Toribio is that non-representationalism 
exhibited by the Watt governor does not seem to address ‘representation-hungry’ 
problem domains. 
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A ‘representation-hungry’ problem domain for Clark and Toribio is one where 1) the 
problem involves reasoning about absent, non-existent, or counter-factual states of 
affairs; or 2) the problem requires the agent to be selectively sensitive to parameters 
whose ambient physical manifestations are complex and unruly (Clark & Toribio, 419). 
In regards to the former, it would include things like planning one’s schedule in 
advance to make time to watch a sporting event, or deciding to buy stocks if a certain 
threshold is met. These particular tasks, prima facie, rely on some inner faculties that 
are not consistently informed by environmental inputs. Therefore, whatever the 
particular faculties are should be considered representational.  
 
In regards to the latter, consider an ensemble of jelly beans dumped out on a table. 
Furthermore, suppose that one’s friend prefers juicy pear over and above all the other 
flavors. Those particular jelly beans are considered to have value attributed to them 
that is not inherent to the physical structure of jelly beans per se. Therefore, one 
would selectively steer clear of the juicy pear jelly beans (JPJB) not because of any 
raw environmental triggers, but rather from the ability to infer the importance of them 
to one’s friend. Clark and Toribio state it is difficult to conceive of a system that 
could perform this discrimination without appealing to one that could consume a 
plethora of superficially different inputs under a common code, then define further 
those inputs according to stored information related to the abstract content, namely 
being liked by one’s friend, but this process involves computational representations 
(Clark & Toribio, 420).  
 
A Modest Answer to the “Representation-Hungry” Challenge 
 
In response to the latter scenario, the DST could give an account for the learning JPJB 
were valued by a friend without appeal to a computational use of representation. DST 
holds that cognition is not bounded to the brain, but is embedded within an 
environment. In other words, they hold that the brain, nervous system, and environment 
are all coupled together, mutually altering and informing one another. In this way, the 
learning process of non-physical property attributed to the JPJB is not achieved through 
some computational algorithm, but through a simultaneous coupling of dynamic 
systems that when reach an equilibrium point is achieved, representation occurs, 
standing in for ones friend’s preference for JPJB. Therefore, the discrimination of JPJB 
from the other flavors on account of the value attributed to them can be achieved 
without the use of computational representations.  
 
The difficulty arises in explaining how one continues to remember ones friend prefers 
JPJB even when not coupled with the same the same environmental inputs. This 
problem is along the same lines as reasoning about absent, non-existent things, and 
counterfactuals.  It could be the case that when one recalls their friend’s affinity for 
JPJB it is due to some environmental inputs that match up, in such a way, that an 
attractor basin responsible for JPJB knowledge is sufficiently engaged causing an 
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equilibrium point when activated. In other words, other combinations of environmental 
inputs could be coupled to activate the same attractor basin responsible for the JPJB 
knowledge. For example, say one component of the mechanical linkage in the Watt 
governor was switched out with another slightly smaller—or larger—given the rest of 
the linkage the ideal system state should be still tended toward.  There may not have to 
be an exact replication of prior environmental factors to bring about the memory of 
some previously learned thing.    
 
The same may be said about thinking of non-existent objects or counterfactuals. An 
equilibrium point could be developed for unicorns along the same lines as learning 
about a non-physical property of JPJB. The same kind of story may be said about the 
counterfactual “if the 49ers won the NFCC, then they would have won the Superbowl.” 
Namely, just because one experiences mental content about possible events or non-
existent objects, it doesn’t follow there are tokens in the head being manipulated that 
instantiates that content. It could very well be dynamic mechanisms that supply the 
content one is aware of. After all, Clark and Chalmers state some tasks of cognition in 
which one is not directly aware of, such as: The retrieval of memories, language 
processing, and skill acquisition (Clark & Chalmers, The Extended Mind). Given the 
account above of a dynamical representation of mental content, it seems being 
conscious of non-existent objects or counterfactuals could be added to Clark and 
Chalmers’ list.     
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